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Abstract
We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can
in￿ uence the probability that the true state of nature is veri￿ed. This setting is widely applicable
for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state veri￿cation takes place. However, we
use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection
contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion
and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we ￿nd conditions under which a
government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal
and the agent can in￿ uence the probability that the true state of nature is veri￿ed. We do not allow
the principal to commit to an audit strategy before observing the signal from the agent. Such a setting
is widely applicable to situations of fraud. Fraudulent claims for bene￿ts, insurance payments, or loans
are examples. It even could be applied to the broad range of situations where bilateral trade of goods
takes place. Whenever it is hard and expensive to verify the value of a good for a potential buyer
(antiques, paintings), while the seller has private information about this value, such a moral-hazard
situation may arise. However, the application we choose is the case of tax evasion. This will enable
us to draw conclusions about the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and the resources wasted by the
agents￿attempts to in￿ uence the detection probability.
The early neoclassical approach to income tax evasion (e.g. Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki,
1974) treats the detection probability as an exogenous parameter.1 In later contributions the audit
probability was endogenized in two di⁄erent ways. Reinganum and Wilde (1985) derive an optimal
audit rule under the assumption that the authority has to invest in the audit probability.2 In a
neoclassical optimal taxation framework Cremer and Gahvari (1994) allow for the taxpayer to in￿ uence
the audit probability by spending some resources on covering actions. In this paper, we explicitly model
both the tax authority investing in detection and the taxpayer spending some income to cover evasion
activity. The detection probability is determined by the e⁄ort exerted by both parties. We believe
that for many countries the relationship between taxpayer and tax authority is quite competitive, and
accordingly is accurately described by such a contest.
Furthermore, in the real world we observe that di⁄erent sources of income lead to di⁄erent eva-
sion and concealment opportunities.3 We include this fact in our model by just focusing on single
components of income with di⁄erent marginal coverage and ￿xed evasion costs. So we end up with
separate evasion, coverage and detection decisions for di⁄erent possible income components. The sum
of all these decisions determines the over all income after tax - including possible ￿nes.4 We think
that this approach, that allows for income structures with distinct income parts, is more realistic than
the widely used framework where the aggregate income is considered to be homogenous and evasion
decisions are modelled as continuous choices. This approach is related to Macho-Stadler and Perez-
Castrillo (1997). There taxpayers are heterogeneous in income and income sources are heterogeneous
1For a detailed survey and many extensions to the basic neoclassical model see Cowell (1990).
2For a more general characterization of optimal enforcement schemes see Chander and Wilde (1998).
3The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program of the U.S. (IRS, 1983) e.g. estimates for 1981 that tax compliance
for wages and salaries was 93.9%, 59.4% for capital gains, and only 37.2% for rents.
4By restricting our analysis to uncorrelated earnings probabilities, a linear tax system, and a penalty that does not
depend on the over-all income, we can treat these decisions as independent.
2in the (exogenous) probability of veri￿cation if an audit takes place. We endogenize the veri￿cation
probability by introducing a contest. Furthermore, we do not assume that the tax authority can
commit to an audit strategy. This re￿ ects our aim to analyze the interaction between tax authority
and taxpayer positively instead of characterizing an optimal, committable audit, penalty, and tax
structure. We think that the normative approaches in the latter tradition su⁄er the problem that
maximizing social welfare only with respect to tax evasion does not take into account that tax rates
and ￿nes may have more in￿ uence on welfare through other channels. The results of those models
may be misleading for this reason.
We examine the equilibrium predictions of the model and ￿nd conditions the parameters have to
satisfy in order that certain equilibria are obtained (such as e.g. \contest￿or \honest taxpayer￿ ). Our
main ￿nding is that in the tax evasion setting with incomplete and imperfect information no credible
strategy for the tax authority exists that prevents tax evasion with certainty if the taxpayer has the
opportunity of evading.5 This ￿nding di⁄ers from the standard literature (see e.g. Reinganum and
Wilde (1985), Border and Sobel (1987), Mookherjee and Png (1989), Mookherjee and Png (1990) or
Chander and Wilde (1998)), where optimal incentive-compatible enforcement schemes are derived.
There the possibility of committing to a certain strategy is the key for the nonexistence of evasion.
We follow the non-commitment assumption, which was introduced into the tax evasion literature by
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Graetz et al. (1986). Our model shares some characteristics with
Khalil (1997), who uses the price-regulation setup of Baron and Myerson (1982) and combines it with
production-cost auditing. We think that the result in our model - i.e. the taxpayer always evades at
least with a very small probability if he has the opportunity to do so - is empirically more realistic. In
addition, our model predicts more tax evasion if tax rates are raised. This empirically established fact
is hardly explainable with the traditional neoclassical models.6 In the normative part of this paper we
analyze the impact of tax rates on resources wastefully invested in detection and concealment. Addi-
tionally, we examine the conditions under which a government directive that commits the authority
to an evasion preventing audit rule, reduces the resources wasted in the enforcement process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we discuss the timing of
the game and our main assumptions. Then we develop the basic setup and analyze the impact of tax
rates on evasion and wasted resources. In the following section we examine the conditions an external
commitment device such as a law or government directive that commits the authority to an e⁄ort
leading to truthful revelation has to satisfy in order to be waste reducing. In section 5 we analyze
the robustness of our results in a richer framework where tax and ￿ne systems can be non-linear. We
conclude with some remarks on the policy implications of the presented model.
5We de￿ne a positive evasion opportunity as a situation where the ￿xed evasion costs are not prohibitive.
6A concise overview over the logic of di⁄erent generations of tax-evasion models can be found in Franzoni (1999).
32 Timing and basic assumptions
In this section we develop the structure of the model and brie￿ y discuss the underlying assumptions.
We begin with the timing.
2.1 Timing
Before we comment on the reasons for choosing the present structure, we introduce the timing of our
model and some notation. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Nature determines the actual income ya
i for every possible income source i.
2. The taxpayer observes ya
i .
3. The taxpayer declares his income di 2 f0;ya
i g, and chooses the e⁄ort ei 2 [0;1) to cover a
possible evasion for every possible income source i.
4. The authority observes the declared income di for every source i. It does not observe the true
income ya
i and the concealment e⁄ort ei exerted by the taxpayer.
5. The authority chooses a certain veri￿cation e⁄ort ai 2 [0;1) for every possible income source.
6. Nature decides whether evasion is veri￿able or not. The probability of veri￿ability is given by
pi(ai;ei) for the di⁄erent possible income components.
7. Taxpayer and authority receive their payo⁄s Ui and Ri, respectively.
Since we are not primarily interested in the e⁄ects of taxes on the income generation decision,
we treat income as endogenously determined by nature. Furthermore, the induction of the income-
generating mechanism does not lead to additional strategic e⁄ects. For reasons of clarity and simplicity
we prefer not to model them.
2.2 The basic assumptions
Here we will explain the basic assumptions to be used in the main part of this chapter.
A1 Declaration is a binary decision for the di⁄erent income sources, i.e. di 2 f0;ya
i g.
This assumption closely corresponds with our usage of the term ￿income￿sources. Income sources
in our sense are speci￿c components of possible income, which are not divisible in terms of certi￿cation.
Usually, the tax authorities - at least in systems with developed tax collection - ask for documents
proving the value of declared income components. These are e.g. payment certi￿cates issued by the
employer, bank certi￿cates for interest payments or copies of bills for deductions of expenses. So we
4assume that it is only possible to declare and certify a certain income component or not to declare
it at all. However, this assumption is not crucial at all. In the linear framework we use, an interior
declaration level is never optimal. To exclude the possibility of interior declaration levels from the
beginning makes the notation easier and proves convenient for expositional reasons.







yi with probability ￿i
0 with probability 1 ￿ ￿i
:
The income sources are assume to be uncorrrelated.7
A2 considerably simpli￿es the analysis and could indeed be regarded as an oversimpli￿cation.
However, the main results still hold if we relax this assumption.
A3 Both taxpayer and tax authority are risk neutral. They maximize expected net income and net
revenue, respectively.
To assume a risk-neutral agents is a standard assumption in tax evasion games (e.g. Reinganum
and Wilde, 1985). Risk-aversion complicates the model without adding any new qualitative insights.
However it is less obvious what the objective function for the tax authority should be. There are
alternative formulations that seem reasonable. Assuming that the authority maximizes net penalties
instead of net revenue does not have any qualitative in￿ uence on our results. We would obtain
qualitatively equivalent results if the tax authority were assumed to maximize net recovered revenue
- an assumption indicating that bureaucrats care about their perceived performance.
A4 The tax system is linear (i.e. T(d) = t
Pn
i=1 di) and the penalty is proportional to the amount of
taxes evaded or avoided (i.e. F(d;ya) = f ￿ t
Pn
i=1(ya
i ￿ di) with f > 1).
This assumption serves two purposes. Firstly, it makes the results of this paper comparable to
most of the existing work on tax evasion, since such tax and penalty systems are widely used in the
literature. Secondly, this assumption makes sure that we can treat the overall tax liability and possible
penalties as a simple sum of outcomes for the single income components. In this setting the choices of
declared income, concealment and detection e⁄ort are independent for the di⁄erent income sources.
In section 5 we explore the robustness of our results under non-linear tax and ￿ne systems.
A5 The veri￿cation probability pi increases with detection e⁄ort ai and decreases with concealment
e⁄ort ei. The marginal cost of in￿ uencing the veri￿cation probability in the favorable direction
increases with the e⁄ort.
7In section (5) we allow for correlation.










A6 The concealment costs Ci and the detection costs Ai are linear in e⁄ort.
The marginal concealment cost may depend on some parameters that describe the speci￿c en-
vironment for the concealment of that income component. Banking system, laws to prevent money
laundering, and the degree of transparency in capital markets are examples. Realistically, the marginal
detection cost could depend on the amount of income concealed, since it is harder to conceal large
amounts of money.8
Ci(ei;￿) = ci(￿) ￿ ei: (2)
Without loss of generality we can normalize the marginal detection cost to unity.
Ai(ai) = ai (3)
This assumption re￿ ects the observation that it is more costly for the tax evader to hide his evasion
more e⁄ectively. He will take the cheaper measures to conceal before using the more expensive ones.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that it is getting more and more expensive for the
authority to achieve an extra percent of detection or veri￿cation probability, because tax inspectors
should begin seeking where it is easiest to ￿nd evidence. We are aware that audit technologies may
locally exhibit economies of scale or may not be continuous. However, the assumption that the
authority uses the most e⁄ective means of detection ￿rst guarantees that all relevant audit e⁄orts
are on a concave function. Then the proposed continuous formulation can be seen as a convenient
simpli￿cation that allows the application of calculus. The only property we need for our main results,
is that the marginal costs of in￿ uencing the probability in its favoured direction are increasing. We
do not allow the concealment cost to depend directly on the tax rate. We think, this is a realistic
restriction that considerably simpli￿es the algebra.
A7 Tax evasion causes ￿xed evasion cost Ki to the evader.
Finally, we allow for some evasion costs Ki, which are incurred whenever the taxpayer tries to
evade an income component. This re￿ ects the observation that not only concealment, but also evasion
may be costly. Sometimes an evasion opportunity has to be created in order to have the possibility to
evade. There are expenses that do not vary with the level of concealment. Another part of Ki are the
often cited moral costs of evasion. We use these moral cost as - admittedly, a somewhat crude - black
8To simplify the notation in what follows we will drop the possible arguments of the marginal cost function.
6box variable that describes psychological di⁄erences of taxpayers (like ethics, attitudes etc.) leading
to di⁄erent evasion behaviour in identical situations.9
2.3 The payo⁄s and some notation
Let us now specify the payo⁄ functions for the two players. It follows from our assumptions that the
expected interim payo⁄- after declaration and e⁄orts are determined - for the taxpayer can be written
as












(ci ￿ ei + Ki)
where H is the set of all i with di = ya
i ; which is the set of truthfully declared income sources.
The ￿rst sum gives the certain after-tax income for all income components that are declared. The
second represents the income for the undeclared income parts - expected penalties included. The ￿nal,
negative sum contains the concealment and evasion cost.
Following our assumption about the objective function of the tax authority (A3), we can write the
expected payo⁄ of the authority as:












Because of the linear system and the risk neutrality assumption we immediately see that the maxi-
mization for both objective functions is piecewise if income sources are uncorrelated. This leads to
the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The decisions (declaration di, concealment e⁄ort ei and detection e⁄ort ai) for income
source i are independent of the decisions for all other income sources dj, ej, and aj with j 6= i.
Proof. Obvious.
Lemma 1 tells us that we can restrict ourselves to examining the decisions for a single income
component. To simplify our notation we drop the indices for the potential income sources.
In order to be able to interpret the results we will derive, it is helpful to de￿ne the ratio of marginal






9For some experimental evidence on psychological di⁄erences as predictors for evasion behaviour see Bayer and Reichl
(1997) or Anderhub et al. (2001).
10Note, that ￿ depends on the same arguments as c.
7A further de￿nition that will help the intuition is to use the ratio of ￿xed evasion cost to the possible
tax-bill reduction to de￿ne the evasion opportunity ! as follows:




An evasion opportunity ! of 0 means that a taxpayer has to invest the same amount of money (or
time, nerves, and moral tension, respectively) to be able to evade as the possible tax bill reduction
would be. More precisely, the evasion opportunity here is a percentage measure of the possible tax
bill reduction net of evasion cost.
It remains to de￿ne the amount of resources invested wastefully in the process of declaration and
auditing. The waste is de￿ned as the sum of the costs for evasion, covering action, and detection
activity:
W = ce + a + ￿K; (8)
where ￿ is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if the income component is earned and evaded
and 0 otherwise.
3 Signaling with hidden action
We concentrate on the genuine tax evasion situation, where the authority can neither observe the true
income, nor the concealment e⁄ort. This might be the most frequent situation the tax authority faces
when receiving tax returns. The only information the tax authority has is the probability distribution
over the distinct income parts. As a simplifying assumption (see A2) we assumed a dichotomous
distribution. Consequentially, the tax inspector knows that the taxpayer has the income component
(worth an amount of y) with probability ￿. With probability 1￿￿ the income from this income source
is 0. This is common knowledge.
The solution concept we use is that of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The game the actors
face can be classi￿ed as a signaling game with hidden action. In our case an equilibrium consists of
three elements: a strategy for the taxpayer, a strategy for the authority, and the authority￿ s beliefs
about the true income of the taxpayer. The strategy for the taxpayer speci￿es a declaration (signal)
and a concealment e⁄ort (hidden action) conditioned on whether he earned the income or not. The
strategy for the authority is a detection e⁄ort depending on the observed declaration. The authority￿ s
beliefs assign probabilities to the income of the taxpayer. They depend on the observed declaration
and are updated by using Bayes￿Rule. In equilibrium the strategies maximize the actors￿payo⁄s
given the beliefs. The beliefs have to be consistent with the equilibrium strategies.
Unlike other models (e.g. Chander and Wilde, 1998) in our case the revelation principle does not
hold. The reason is twofold. Firstly, we do not allow the authority to commit beforehand to a certain
action. But even if we allowed for that, the revelation principle would fail, since secondly the nature
8of the contest restricts the set of feasible contracts. We will see the di⁄erence of outcomes when we
compare an externally enforced incentive compatible e⁄ort scheme to the equilibrium in our original
game.
3.1 Equilibria for di⁄erent parameter settings
Let us begin with an obvious statement about the taxpayer￿ s behaviour. Declaring any non-existent
income never pays. So reporting zero if no income is earned is part of any equilibrium. The corre-
sponding concealment e⁄ort is also zero.
d￿(yajya = 0) = 0 (9)
e￿(yajya = 0) = 0 (10)
When the tax authority has to decide how much to invest in detection, its only information is the
declaration of the taxpayer. It may face a declaration of d = 0 or d = y. If an income declaration of
y is observed it is optimal for the authority to do nothing. This is also part of any equilibrium:
a￿(djd = y) = 0 (11)
If the inspector representing the authority ￿nds that the taxpayer declared no income, he might
not be sure whether he faces a tax evader or just a person who really received no income from the
source in question. He has to form some beliefs. Denote the belief that he faces a tax evader, which is
the subjective probability that the true type of the taxpayer is y if he reports 0, as ￿(ya = yjd = 0).
Applying Bayes￿Rule this belief should be
￿(ya = yjd = 0) =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
, (12)
where ￿ is the probability that a taxpayer with positive income does not declare it.11 We allow the
taxpayer to play a mixed strategy. Now we can express the objective function of the authority if it
faces a declaration of 0 as the expected ￿ne collected net of detection costs:
ER(a;e;￿;djd = 0) = ￿ ￿ f ￿ t ￿ y ￿ p(a;e) ￿ a;
where ￿ is the abbreviated form of (12).
Investing valuable resources in concealment if there is nothing to conceal is a strictly dominated
strategy for the taxpayer. So we have
e￿(yajya = y ; djd = y) = 0.
Taking this into account and allowing for mixing we can state the relevant ex ante objective function
for the taxpayer under the condition that he earned the income component:
EU(e;a;yajya = y) = ￿(y ￿ p(e;a) ￿ f ￿ t ￿ y ￿ c ￿ e) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ t)y
11Implicitly we already apply the consistency requirement that the authority puts a zero probability on the taxpayer
declaring some income if he has not got it (see equation 9).
93.2 Pure strategy equilibrium
Let us now look for pure strategy equilibria. Note that equations (9) to (11) are part of any equilibrium.
To ￿nd a pure strategy equilibrium we let ￿ = 1 (the taxpayer always evades) or ￿ = 0 (the taxpayer
never evades). For the case of a pure evasion equilibrium we plug ￿ = 1 into both of the objective
functions and ￿nd the optimal values for a and e. This is to make sure that the beliefs of the authority
are consistent with the strategy of the tax evader. Later on, we have to check whether - given the
outcome in the simultaneous e⁄ort stage - it is really optimal for the taxpayer to declare no income if




￿ ￿ e ￿ f ￿ t ￿ y
(a + e)




a ￿ f ￿ t ￿ y
(a + e)
2 ￿ c ￿ 0 (14)
The resulting e⁄orts are:
a￿
p =
￿2 ￿ f ￿ t ￿ ￿ ￿ y
(￿ + ￿)2 (15)
e￿
p =
￿ ￿ f ￿ t ￿ ￿2 ￿ y
(￿ + ￿)2 (16)
This is an equilibrium whenever:
ER(e￿
p;a￿
p;djd = 0) ￿ 0
EU(e￿
p;a￿
p;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ t)y
The ￿rst condition always holds.13 The second only holds for certain parameter con￿gurations.14
The condition on the parameters for a pure strategy evasion equilibrium to exist is:
K < t ￿ y
￿





, which simpli￿es to
! ￿
￿ ￿ f(2￿ + ￿)
(￿ + ￿)2 (17)
The question is now what the equilibrium looks like if the evasion opportunity ! is not high enough
to ensure an evasion equilibrium. A natural candidate seems to be a pure non-evasion equilibrium.
But in fact, pure strategy non evasion is not necessarily an equilibrium in this case. The argument
goes as follows. Being honest dominates evasion if the authority exerts the best-response level of e⁄ort.
It is a best response for the authority to exert no e⁄ort if it believes the taxpayer to be honest with
12The second order conditions are obviously satis￿ed.
13ER is equal to fty￿
3=(￿ + ￿)
2 > 0.
14Note that ￿ again is the abbreviation for y
a = y, d = 0.
10certainty (￿ = 0). But if the authority is exerting no e⁄ort it is not a best response for the taxpayer
to be honest if the ￿xed evasion costs are not prohibitive. Then the beliefs o⁄ the equilibrium path
required for this equilibrium would not be consistent. The equilibrium would require ￿ > 0, but since
￿ should be equal to zero by using Bayes￿rule, ￿ should be equal to zero as well. This is an obvious
contradiction.
The condition for a pure strategy non-evasion equilibrium to exist is the trivial case where evasion
is a dominated strategy. This is the case whenever the ￿xed evasion costs K are higher than the
maximal gain from evasion ty. In terms of the evasion opportunity we have a pure strategy non-
evasion equilibrium, whenever
! ￿ 0: (18)
3.3 Hybrid equilibrium
For all the cases where the evasion opportunity is too low for a pure strategy evasion equilibrium, but
too high for pure strategy non evasion, we can ￿nd a hybrid equilibrium. This is an equilibrium where
one type (in our case ya = 0) plays a pure strategy, while the other type (ya = y) randomizes. To ￿nd
this equilibrium we have to ￿nd the evasion probability ￿ that yields the same payo⁄ in equilibrium
as reporting truthfully. To do so we use the ￿rst-order conditions for optimal e⁄orts as functions of
￿. Then we solve for the ￿ that guarantees the taxpayer the honesty payo⁄ y(1 ￿ t). The ￿rst-order




e ￿ f ￿ t ￿ y
(a + e)




f ￿ t ￿ y ￿ a
(a + e)
2 ￿ c) ￿ 0
Solving simultaneously for the optimal e⁄ort depending on ￿ leads to
a￿(￿) =
￿(￿)2 ￿ f ￿ t ￿ y ￿ ￿
(￿ + ￿(￿))2 (19)
e￿(￿) =
￿(￿) ￿ f ￿ t ￿ y ￿ ￿2
(￿ + ￿(￿))2 (20)
Equating the resulting expected payo⁄ EU (e￿(￿);a￿(￿);y) to the honesty payo⁄ (1 ￿ t)y gives









The requirement that this belief has to be consistent with behaviour leads us to the equilibrium
probability of evasion that the taxpayer will use when mixing:
￿￿ =





















0 if d = y












t ￿ y ￿ ￿
￿p
f(f ￿ !) ￿ f + !
￿
if ya = y ^ d(￿￿) = 0
0 else
(24)
Insert ￿gure 1 about here
Figure 1 shows the dependence of the equilibrium type on the income source parameters. We see
that for a lower earning probability ￿ the concealment opportunity ￿ for every ￿ne level f has to
be lower to deter the taxpayer from always evading. The intuition is the following: A lower earning
probability reduces the expected recoverable income (including ￿nes) for the authority. The tax
authority reduces its detection e⁄ort. Knowing this the taxpayer realizes that evading with certainty
pays. Note that the auditing o¢ ce knows (according to its equilibrium beliefs) that the taxpayer
will evade, whenever he got the income: but it just does not pay to step up the e⁄ort, because the
probability of facing a honest taxpayer, who did not earn the income, is too high. Also intuitive is
the result that a higher ￿xed evasion cost K (= lower evasion opportunity to evade !) ceteris paribus
requires a higher concealment opportunity for a taxpayer to cheat with certainty.
Less intuitive, however, is our result that the detection e⁄ort is deterministic. In models with
commitment and perfect auditing it may be optimal for the authority to mix between auditing and
doing nothing (e.g. Mookherjee and Png, 1989). On the ￿rst sight, this feature seems to be very
appealing, because we observe in reality that similar tax declarations may trigger di⁄erent auditing
behaviour. However, the superiority of a random audit rule is driven by the restrictive assumptions
that audits are perfect, that the authority can commit to an audit strategy, and that taxpayers are risk-
averse. The authority commits beforehand to an audit probability that is just high enough to deter
every single taxpayer from evasion. Perfect auditing without commitment, does not cause random
audits to be optimal.
In our model, where the detection probability is determined by the e⁄orts in a contest, not even
allowing for commitment would cause the authority to mix over di⁄erent detection e⁄orts (see section
4). We do not believe that the observed randomness in auditing stems from a situation where the
authority can commit to perfect audits, because that would imply that the authority knowingly audits
honest taxpayers.15 We believe that the tax authority instead conditions its audits on the belief of
facing a tax evader after having received a tax declaration. If we enrich our model by assuming that the
authority has limited auditing resources it might become optimal to concentrate resources randomly
on single taxpayers. In our view this reason for random audits is the more plausible.
15In these models in equilibrium all taxpayers report truthfully.
12Returning to our main purpose, to examine the e⁄ect of tax rates on tax evasion and waste, we
can state the following propositions.
Proposition 1 In the imperfect and incomplete information scenario a higher tax rate ceteris paribus
weakly increases tax evasion for a speci￿c income component if there are ￿xed evasion costs.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 In the imperfect and incomplete information scenario a higher tax rate ceteris paribus
weakly increases the wastefully invested resources for a speci￿c income component if there are ￿xed
evasion costs.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. A higher tax rate provides stronger incentives
for the taxpayer to evade by increasing the possible gain from tax evasion. This e⁄ect is strengthened by
the fact that the evasion opportunity increases with the tax rate, since the ratio between possible gains
and ￿xed evasion cost becomes more favourable. The tax authority, anticipating the stronger evasion
incentives, has an incentive to exert more e⁄ort, because the potential revenue to recover rises with
higher incentives for evasion. The nature of the contest forces the taxpayer to raise his concealment
e⁄ort, as well, to keep track with the higher detection e⁄ort of the authority. These e⁄ects over all
lead to more tax evasion, higher e⁄orts, and consequentially to more wastefully invested resources.
Insert ￿gure 2 about here
Figure 2 shows how the evasion probability for a certain income component depends on the tax
rate (dashed line).16 For low tax rates the income is reported because the ￿xed evasion cost are
prohibitive (! < 0). As the tax rate rises, the taxpayer (in the hybrid equilibrium) evades with
increasing probability, until it pays to evade with certainty if he earned the income component (pure
evasion equilibrium). The solid line depicts the expected waste in percent of the expected earned
income for the same parameter con￿guration.
It is also interesting to investigate the role of ￿; which is the prior probability that a speci￿c
income component is earned. The in￿ uence of the earnings probability comes from its relevance for
the beliefs the tax authority might have, whenever it observes a zero declaration. A very low earnings
probability tells the authority that it is very unlikely to face a tax evader after a zero declaration - even
if it believes that the taxpayer evades with certainty if he earns the income. Knowing this, the tax
man will not exert a big detection e⁄ort. In return it is likely that for the taxpayer evasion will pay.
So he evades with certainty. With an increasing earnings probability the expected recoverable income
16The parameter settings were y = 1, ￿ = 2=3; ￿ = :1, K = :2, and f = 3.
13for the tax authority increases. Consequentially, it increases the detection e⁄ort. This makes the
taxpayer - still evading with certainty - try harder to conceal his evasion. The over-all waste increases
with the earnings probability. At a certain level of the earnings probability the detection e⁄ort of
the authority is becoming so massive that for the taxpayer evasion with certainty no longer pays.
The equilibrium switches from pure evasion to the hybrid case. The higher the earnings probability
becomes the larger is the expected revenue from detection e⁄ort for the authority. In order to reduce
the tax inspector￿ s belief that he is facing an evader the taxpayer reduces the evasion probability ￿. In
return the authority reduces the e⁄ort. The expected waste now falls with an increasing probability
that the income source generates the income.
Figure 3 illustrates the intuition above. It shows how the amount of waste depends on the earnings
probability ￿.17 The two graphs correspond to two di⁄erent tax rates (dashed line .4, solid line .25).
On the left of the spike the taxpayer is evading with certainty (pure evasion equilibrium), while we have
a hybrid equilibrium to the right where the taxpayer mixes between evasion and reporting truthfully.
Insert ￿gure 3 about here
4 Externally enforced incentive compatibility
In this section we consider a situation, where the government externally forces the tax authority to
exert as much e⁄ort as necessary to deter tax evasion with certainty. We examine the resources
required under this regime and compare them to the expected waste under the discretionary audit
rule without such an external commitment device.
The reason that in our model the revelation principle does not hold is - besides the restriction
of the set of feasible contracts - the fact that we do not allow the authority to commit beforehand
to a certain e⁄ort level if it observes a declaration of zero. Assume that the government externally
enforces an incentive compatible e⁄ort level upon the authority. That means the government puts a
law or a directive in place that forces the authority to exert an e⁄ort level for any zero declaration
that makes sure that the taxpayer always truthfully reports his income. Here, it is necessary that this
law is common knowledge. Our aim is to examine whether such an external commitment device is
suitable for reducing the wastefully invested resources.
Let ￿ denote the set of all possible parameter con￿gurations. Let   2 ￿ be a speci￿c parameter
con￿guration. Such a con￿guration contains values for the earnings probability ￿; the tax rate t; the
evasion opportunity !, the concealment opportunity ￿; and the potential income y.
Then the government wants the authority to exert an e⁄ort a￿( ;d) such that the incentive con-
17The parameter settings are the same as for the previous ￿gure, except K is reduced to .1.
14straint (IC) for the taxpayer holds for every possible parameter con￿guration:
EU (d = y;ya = y;a￿( ;y);e￿) ￿ EU (d = 0;y = ya;a￿( ;0);e) 8e ￿ 0 8  2 ￿ (IC)
This just means that the expected payo⁄ of the taxpayer if he earned an income component and
declared it is at least as high as if he evaded it. We do not have to bother with the IC for the case
the taxpayer did not earn the income component, since it is a dominant strategy to truthfully report
zero, no matter what the e⁄ort of the tax authority will be. Since we are interested in the minimal
a￿ we already know the optimal e⁄ort, in the case that the taxpayer reports truthfully if he got the
income, which has to be zero.
a￿( ;y) = 0 8  2 ￿ (25)
The best the taxpayer can do if he is forced to report his earned income is to exert no e⁄ort
(e￿ = 0). Therefore, the left hand side of (IC) reduces to EU(y;y;0;0) = y(1￿t). We also know from
our previous analysis that the expected ex post income after evasion decreases with the authorities
e⁄ort. In order to minimize a￿ the authority will choose to make (IC) binding. Then the best a tax
evader can do is to choose a concealment e⁄ort that maximizes his payo⁄, given the commitment e⁄ort
of the authority. (IC) becomes:
y(1 ￿ t) = EU (0;y;a￿( ;0);e￿(a￿)) 8  2 ￿. (26)
To solve this problem for a￿( ;0) is straightforward. Using the envelope theorem we maximize
EU(0;y;￿) with respect to a given a, and choose a such that the equality holds. This leads to the





t ￿ y ￿ ￿(2f ￿ 2
p
f(f ￿ !) ￿ ! if ! > 0
0 else
(27)
The question is whether this external commitment that deters the taxpayer from cheating is
generally resource saving. That this is not the case is easily seen if we express the waste in terms of a





[t ￿ y ￿ ￿(2f ￿ 2
p
f(f ￿ !) ￿ !],
which is the e⁄ort that is pointlessly exerted in the case of a true income declaration of 0, times the
probability that the income is not earned, divided by the expected income. We see that Wc tends
to in￿nity whenever ￿ approaches zero. Recall the expected waste in our non-commitment scenario,
when for a small earnings probability a pure evasion equilibrium is played:
Wnc;% =
(2t ￿ f ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
(￿ + ￿)2 + (1 ￿ !)t.
18Here the taxpayer is indi⁄erent between evading or not evading. With an in￿nitesimal higher e⁄ort deterrence would
be certain.
15In this case the expected percentage waste tends to t(1 ￿ !) when ￿ approaches zero. This
suggests that the external commitment might be not a good solution for income sources where the
earning probability is small. For high earning probabilities though this policy might reduce wasted
resources. This is documented in the simulation in ￿gure 4, where the solid (dashed) line represents
the waste in the non-commitment (commitment) case.
Insert ￿gure 4 about here
This result yields some important policy implications. The presence of a tax evasion contest causes
an extra welfare loss. This loss consists of the resources that are unproductively spent on concealment
and detection. The analysis above provides some guidelines how a government should organize tax
enforcement activities in order to keep this loss as small as possible. The regime appropriate for income
sources that are common to most citizens should be di⁄erent from the regime for sources that generate
income for only few people. For likely income sources such as income from dependent employment
or interest payments on savings a resource saving enforcement policy has to guarantee that the costs
for concealment are prohibitive. A policy that deters evasion of such income components may reduce
wasted resources even if it is expensive to set up such a policy. The intuition is straightforward. The
resources saved by deterring the many people that earn such income components from investing in
concealment may outweigh the costs for conducting the policy. This fact may be a reason why in
most countries taxes on income from dependent work and taxes on interest payments are deducted
at source. This regime causes considerable costs for ￿rms, banks, and authorities, but makes evasion
almost impossible.
The enforcement of taxes paid on income from unlikely sources should consist of audits conducted
by an authority with certain discretionary powers. In this case a regime that eliminates all evasion
incentives may cost more than it saves concealment costs by deterring the few people that earn such
income components from entering a contest.
5 Alternative tax and ￿ne systems
In this section we explore the robustness of the ￿nding that a higher tax rate leads to more evasion.
First, we shortly comment on a non-linear ￿ne scheme. Then we extend our model in a way that
allows us to deal with non-linear tax systems.
5.1 Alternative ￿ne schemes
So far we assumed that the ￿ne payable for detected evasion is linearly dependent on the tax evaded.
However, many real world ￿ne schemes are not linear. A system where the evasion of large amounts
leads to imprisonment may be an example where the ￿ne increases more than linearly with the tax
16evaded. On the other hand, a ￿ne that is calculated on the basis of concealed income instead of evaded
taxes is totally independent of the tax rate. We are not aware of any empirically relevant system where
the ￿ne depends negatively on evaded taxes. We therefore exclude this case.
If we replace the speci￿c ￿ne (fty) by F and solve for the optimal pure-evasion e⁄orts we get
a￿
p =
￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ F
(￿ + ￿)2 (28)
e￿
p =
￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ F
(￿ + ￿)2 (29)
instead of (23) and (24). So the pure evasion e⁄orts only depend on the tax rate if the ￿nes also
depend on the tax rate. This is intuitively obvious as the prize of the detection-concealment contest is
just the ￿ne. We now investigate, how tax rate changes in￿ uence evasion behaviour if the tax scheme
is not linear, by looking at the maximum moral cost an evading taxpayer can have.
The maximum moral cost ^ K can be found by looking at a taxpayer which is indi⁄erent between
evading and reporting truthfully. Solving the indi⁄erence condition EU(e￿
p;a￿
p;ya = y;d = 0) = (1￿t)y
for ^ K gives:
















As the lhs is greater than one we can say that by increasing the tax rate a taxpayer that was previously
indi⁄erent between evasion and truthful reporting will only report truthfully if the tax hike increases
the ￿ne-income ratio by more than factor one. Note that for a ￿ne that depends on the tax evaded
a rising tax rate can only cause a former evader to (at least sometimes) report truthfully if the ￿ne
increases more than proportionally with the tax evaded. If the ￿ne does not depend on the tax evaded
the opposite is true. Then some formerly at least sometimes truthfully reporting taxpayers will evade
with certainty after a tax rise. If we assume that taxpayers do not get a psychological grati￿cation
from evasion (negative moral cost) we have an upper bound for the ￿ne Fmax, which allows for at least
some evasion. This maximum ￿ne can be found by solving equation (30) for F and setting ^ K equal








Note that in a ￿ne system where the ￿ne is linear in the tax evaded F=(yt) = F0=y = f holds. This
shows that in such a tax system the maximum ￿ne condition implies the condition for more evasion
(31). Put di⁄erently, in a system with linear ￿nes higher taxes lead to more evasion if the ￿nes are
not prohibitive for all taxpayers
For a systems that does not compensate for a rising tax rate by also increasing the ￿ne considerably
higher tax rates lead to more taxpayers evading with certainty. A corollary is that if the ￿ne does not
17rise considerably with the tax rate (inequality 31 holds) then more resources are wasted due to more
evasion.19
We now turn to the taxpayers with moral cost which are too high for evading with certainty. The
e⁄orts in the hybrid equilibrium for a more general ￿ne can be found by simply replacing (fty) by F
in equations (19) and (20)
a￿
h(￿) =
￿(￿)2 ￿ ￿ ￿ F
(￿ + ￿(￿))2 (33)
e￿
h(￿) =
￿(￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿ F
(￿ + ￿(￿))2 (34)
As in the section with speci￿c ￿nes we need to determine the equilibrium beliefs of the authority that
are consistent with the taxpayer being indi⁄erent between evasion and truthfully reporting. Using (19)
and (20) with the replaced ￿ne we can solve the indi⁄erence condition EU (e￿(￿);a￿(￿);y) = (1￿t)y
for the equilibrium belief ￿￿(￿):20:








As ￿￿(￿) is derived from ￿ using Bayes￿rule we basically could now solve for the evasion probability
￿￿. However, this is not really necessary as ceteris paribus an increase in ￿ implies that ￿ must have
increased.21 So for a given taxpayer with moral cost such that partial evasion is optimal, the evasion
probability increases with the tax rate if d￿￿=dt > 0. Suppose F potentially depends on the tax rate.
Then we get the following condition for more tax evasion
￿F
￿
yF ￿ (ty ￿ K)dF
dt
￿









It is interesting that the rise in the ￿ne necessary to prevent a taxpayer from evading more often as a
response to a tax rise increases with the moral cost of the taxpayer. Morally constrained tax payers
are reacting more strongly to higher taxes.
To ￿nd a su¢ cient condition for a higher tax rate to lead to more evasion for all taxpayers, we
can use a lower bound for F: The lowest F for the hybrid equilibrium is the F that makes taxpayers
indi⁄erent between evading with certainty and playing a hybrid equilibrium. This is just the F that








19In the case where the ￿nes do not depend on the tax rate the waste per evader stays the same. However, more people
will evade with certainty.
20Recall that ￿(￿) is the probability the tax authority assigns to the event that an observed declaration of zero comes
from an evader which evades with probability ￿ in case she earned the income.
21This has to be the case as d￿=d￿ > 0, which implies that ￿(￿) is invertible and d￿=d￿ > 0.
18which identical to the condition we get for pure evasion. We summarize this ￿nding in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Condition (31) on the ￿ne system and parameters is su¢ cient for a tax rise leading
to more tax evasion.
It now remains to check if the wasted resources are increasing with higher tax rates in the hybrid
equilibrium. It is su¢ cient to check whether the wasted resources increase with the equilibrium belief
￿￿. If this is the case then condition (31) is su¢ cient for higher tax rates increasing the waste of
resources. The expected wasted resources in the contest for the hybrid equilibrium are given by
EW := ￿￿(￿￿)(e￿
h + K) + (￿￿(￿￿) + 1 ￿ ￿)a￿
h:
Note that we can write the equilibrium evasion probability as a function of the beliefs. Using the
equilibrium values for the e⁄orts from equations (19) and (20) and di⁄erentiating leads to
dEW
d￿￿ =
2F￿￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(￿ + ￿)
￿




So increasing equilibrium beliefs that an evasion has occurred whenever the tax authority observes a
zero declaration are su¢ cient for more waste. As higher tax rate increase the evasion probability and
therefore the believed evasion probability if condition (31) holds, we have the same su¢ cient condition
for higher tax rates leading to more waste as we obtained for more tax evasion. Adding the insight
we obtained for taxpayers, who always evade, leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Condition (31) on the ￿ne system and parameters is su¢ cient for a tax rise leading
to more wasted resources.
We want to emphasize two points: Firstly, the condition we state is only a su¢ cient condition,
which means that we may have more wasted resources due to higher tax rates even if the condition
does not hold. Secondly, the condition tells us that waste increases with the tax rate for every taxpayer
with K < ty. So aggregate waste could still increase if the condition is violated as taxpayers with high
K may still evade more often if tax rates increase.
5.2 Non-linear tax systems
Suppose we have an income source which may yield the same amount of income more than once over
the course of a ￿nancial year. Think of the rent from an investment property. Depending on the
time occupied the income received will be a multiple of the weekly rent. The typical information
the tax authority will have is that the taxpayer owns the property and the weekly rent paid for such
a property in the market. However, what the authority does not know is the time the property is
actually occupied.
19The incentives to evade taxes on rent income are very similar to those in previous sections if we
keep the assumption of a linear tax system, where ￿nes are proportional to evaded taxes. However,
if the tax system is non-linear then the average tax and ￿ne rate changes with every additional week
worth of rent declared to the tax authority, which in￿ uences the incentives to evade and to conceal
for the taxpayer.
We use a simpli￿ed framework of an income source which can generate the same amount of income
(normalized to 1) once, twice, or does not generate any income at all. This will give rise to a framework
rich enough to explore the e⁄ects di⁄erent tax systems have on evasion frequencies and resources wasted
in the contest. The earnings probabilities, which are common knowledge, are given by:22
y =
8
> > > <
> > > :
2 ￿2
1 with probability ￿1
0 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2:
(35)
For simplicity we exclude partial evasion. A taxpayer who earned the income twice cannot mimic
a truthful taxpayer who earned the income once. This restriction greatly simpli￿es the analysis while
the main incentives are still present.23 Denote the taxpayer￿ s mixed strategy probabilities of evasion as
￿2 if the true income is 2 and as ￿1 if the true income is 1. A strategy for the taxpayer consists of these
probabilities and a concealment e⁄ort for every possible combination of earnings and declarations.24
Denote the concealment e⁄ort the taxpayer exerts if he earned an income of ￿ and declared d as ed(￿):
So e0(1) denotes the e⁄ort a taxpayer with ya = 1 exerts if he declares an income of 0. Then a
strategy of a taxpayer - excluding the trivial case when no income is earned - is given by the vector
(￿1;￿2;e0(1);e0(2);e1(1);e2(2)): A strategy for the authority is given by a detection e⁄ort for every
possible declaration (a0;a1;a2):
In order to be able to investigate the in￿ uence of progressive and regressive tax systems we allow
the average tax rates to vary with income. The legal average tax rate for income levels of 1 and 2
are denoted by t1 and t. We restrict our analysis to tax systems where the tax liability increases with
income, i.e. t2 > t1=2:25 We return to a ￿ne which is proportional to the evaded income. The ￿ne
factor is given by f once again. Without loss of generality we normalize the marginal concealment
and detection costs to 1. The moral costs a taxpayer has to bear if he evades (indicated by ￿ = 1) are
denoted by K: Then the interim expected payo⁄ for the taxpayer is given by
22This earnings structure is very general and allows for correlation among income parts.
23If we allow for partial evasion we have to deal with multiple equilibria depending on o⁄-equilibrium beliefs of the
tax authority.
24The concavity of the taxpayer￿ s objective function in e⁄orts for every given income and declaration ensures that we
don￿ t have to take mixing among e⁄ort levels into account.
25Note that this does not rule out regressive tax systems (with decreasing average tax rate t2 < t1):
20EU(y;d;ed(y);ad) = y ￿ tdd ￿ p(ad;ed(y))[y ￿ tdd]f ￿ ed(y) ￿ ￿K; (36)
where p(ad;ed(y)) is the detection probably depending on concealment and detection e⁄ort.







￿=1 ￿￿ ￿ p(a0;e0(￿))￿ ￿ a0 if d = 0
tdd ￿ ad if d > 0
(37)
The expected payo⁄ for the authority after observing a zero declaration is given by the ￿ne it expects
to collect net of detection costs. The expected ￿ne depends on the beliefs ￿￿ that the declaration of 0
comes from a taxpayer who actually earned an income of ￿: If the tax authority observes a declaration
d > 0 then there cannot be any evasion. So no ￿nes will ever be collected.
We now determine the optimal concealment and detection e⁄orts given a declaration and the
authority￿ s beliefs. It is obvious that a taxpayer who reports truthfully should never exert any e⁄ort:
e￿
￿(￿) = 0 8￿ 2 f0;1;2g:
Equally trivial are the optimal detection e⁄orts for positive declarations. As the authority cannot
expect any ￿nes to be collected it should not exert any e⁄ort in these cases:
a￿
d = 0 8d 2 f1;2g:
The non trivial case of e⁄orts for zero declarations requires the taxpayer to maximize the expected
payo⁄ given the income, while the tax authority maximizes the expected revenue given the zero
declaration.
Now we determine the e⁄orts for the remaining cases. The taxpayer chooses an e⁄ort given
his actual income and declaration decision maximizing expected after tax income (36), while the
authority chooses its detection e⁄ort which maximizes expected revenue (37) depending on beliefs and




= 2f ￿ t2
￿2 ￿ e0(2)
(a0 + e0(2))
2 + f ￿ t1
￿1 ￿ e0(1)
(a0 + e0(1))
2 ￿ 1 = 0




a0 ￿ f ￿ t1
(a0 + e0(1))




a0 ￿ f ￿ 2t2
(a0 + e0(2))
2 ￿ 1 = 0
26Global concavity of ER and EU guaranties that the second-order conditions are satis￿es.






















1 + ￿1 + ￿2
: (41)
In equilibrium the beliefs ￿1 and ￿2 have to be consistent with behaviour. Denoting the evasion









1 ￿ ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿1)
: (43)
5.3 Pure strategy evasion equilibrium
In this section we will explore the conditions under which pure strategy equilibria are feasible. There
is an obvious pure strategy equilibrium, where neither evasion nor concealment and detection takes
place. This is the case whenever the taxpayer has a moral cost that is so high that it outweighs the
potential monetary bene￿t from evasion. For K > 2t2 evasion never occurs as the maximum monetary
bene￿t from evasion (2t2) is always smaller than the moral cost. The more interesting case is a pure
strategy evasion equilibrium, where the taxpayer evades with certainty if a positive income is earned.
Evasion with certainty has to be better than compliance for both income levels. We can write the
constraints to be satis￿ed as
EU￿(￿ = 1;d = 0) ￿ EU(￿ = 1;d = 1) (C1)
EU￿(￿ = 2;d = 0) ￿ EU(￿ = 2;d = 2): (C2)
In such an equilibrium the evasion probabilities conditioned on the income (￿1 and ￿2) are both one.
As the beliefs have to be consistent with the taxpayer￿ s strategy, we can conclude that in a pure
strategy evasion equilibrium ￿1 = ￿1 and ￿2 = ￿2 are true. We denote ~ ￿ as ￿ from (41) with the
beliefs ￿1 and ￿2 replaced by the pure strategy evasion equilibrium beliefs ￿1 and ￿2: Then we can
calculate the payo⁄s and rewrite the two constraints:
t1 + f~ ￿
￿




￿ K ￿ 0 (C1￿ )
2t2 + f~ ￿
￿




￿ K ￿ 0: (C2￿ )
Examining the conditions above shows that under a non-linear tax system an increase of the tax rates
t1 or t2 does not necessarily provide stronger incentives for full evasion to taxpayers. If we look at the
22condition for a taxpayer with y = 2 to declare 0 (C2￿ ), for example, we see that increasing t1 does
not e⁄ect the gain from evasion (2t2) but increases the expected losses. The reason for the latter is
that the expected gain for the tax authority increases with t1. An increased t1 increases the potential
￿ne from a pure evader with y = 1: So the authority increases the detection e⁄ort if a declaration
of 0 is received as it could potentially come from a taxpayer with y = 1. This negatively e⁄ects a
taxpayer with y = 2 who plans to declare 0. The same e⁄ect makes it less favourable for a taxpayer
who earned y = 1 to evade if t2 increases (see C1￿ ). Moreover, we can show that only the condition
for a low-income type (C1￿ ) is relevant if we restrict the analysis to tax systems where the tax liability
increases with income (2t2 > t1).
Proposition 5 For tax systems where the liability does not decrease with income (2t2 ￿ t1) a pure
strategy evasion equilibrium exists if t1 + f~ ￿
￿




￿ K ￿ 0:
Proof. We have to show that only C1￿is binding if the additional condition 2t2 ￿ t1 is imposed.
The proof is in two steps:
First we show that if C1￿holds for a tax-rate combination (t1;t2) with t1 = 2t2 then C2￿holds for
all tax rate combinations (^ t1;t2) with ^ t1 < 2t2. This guarantees that C2￿can be replaced by 2t2 ￿ t1
for all t1 where C2￿holds at (t1;t2) with t1 = 2t2: If C1￿holds for a tax rate combination with 2t2 ￿ t1
then C2￿obviously holds, as C2￿and C1￿are identical for 2t2 ￿ t1: So C2￿is slack if C2￿relaxes when









(1 + ￿1 + ￿2)
2 p
t1
< 0 for 2t2 ￿ t1:
Secondly, we need to show that condition C1￿is not contained in the condition 2t2 ￿ t1. C1￿
cannot be contained in 2t2 ￿ t1 if C1￿gets stricter if t2 increases. Di⁄erentiating lhs of C1￿with







as @~ ￿=@t2 > 0 and ~ ￿ ￿
p
t1 < 0 for an interior solution. This concludes the proof.
The fact that we can solely concentrate on C1￿and the monotonicity of the tax system combined
with the fact that C1￿gets stricter with increasing t2; but less strict with increasing t1, provides us
with unique minimum tax rates for a pure strategy equilibrium. The minimum tax rates are such that
C1￿and 2t2 ￿ t1 both hold with equality. Solving the two equations gives the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In every pure strategy evasion equilibrium we must have t1 ￿ tmin and t2 ￿ tmin=2;
where
tmin =
K (1 + ￿1 + ￿2)
2
1 + (￿1 + ￿2)(2 + ￿1 + ￿2)(1 ￿ f)
:
23We can now check whether higher tax rates lead to more wasted resources if tax rates rise in a
pure strategy evasion equilibrium. The expected pure-strategy evasion-equilibrium waste is given by
EW￿




= (￿1 + ￿2)K + 2f~ ￿2
We immediately see that the waste increases with the tax rates t1 and t2 as ~ ￿ increases with the tax
rates.
Proposition 6 In a pure evasion equilibrium raising either t1 or t2 increases the wasted resources if
the increased tax rates still lead to a pure evasion equilibrium.




2 = 0 i⁄ K > max[t1;t2=2]:
5.4 Partial evasion equilibria
In this section we shortly describe the outcome if moral constraints are too strong for a pure strategy
evasion equilibrium, but not strong enough to totally prevent taxpayers from evading. First we
establish the result that no equilibrium exists where both high and low income taxpayers evade with
a positive probability smaller than 1.
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium with ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
2 2 (0;1) ￿ (0;1) and 2t2 > t1:
Proof. In an equilibrium where both types mix between evasion and truthful declaration the
following indi⁄erence conditions must hold:
EU￿(￿ = 1;d = 0;￿￿
1;￿￿
2) = EU(￿ = 1;d = 1)
EU￿(￿ = 2;d = 0;￿￿
1;￿￿
2) = EU(￿ = 2;d = 2):














￿ K = 0;
where ￿ depends on ￿￿
1;￿￿
2 through the equilibrium beliefs. Inspection shows that there is no ￿ that
jointly satis￿es these two conditions. The only case where both equations can be satis￿ed is if 2t2 = t1;
where the two conditions are identical.
We now establish the result that the equilibrium evasion probability for a taxpayer who earned an
income of i weakly increases with ti: For this purpose it is su¢ cient to show that the evasion constraint
24for an i-income taxpayer relaxes; while the constraint for a j-income taxpayer becomes stricter with
increasing ti. If this is true we can also conclude that the evasion probability for an i-income taxpayer
weakly decreases with tj.








￿ 0 8ti;tj;i = 1;2:
Proof. See appendix.
The result above shows the main incentives for the taxpayers. In equilibrium a taxpayer will
(weakly) increase evasion if the average tax rate for his particular income is raised. Evasion becomes
more pro￿table. This is the same force driving the results as for an isolated one-o⁄ income source
discussed in previous sections. However, there is a di⁄erence. In the richer model where we allow for
a multiple income source the tax rate for a particular income creates a negative externality on the
taxpayers with other income levels through the auditing e⁄orts of the tax authority. The authority
can not distinguish if a zero tax return comes from a truthfully reporting taxpayer with income 0
or from a tax cheat with income 1 or 2. Therefore its auditing e⁄ort will re￿ ect something like an
average of the ￿nes it can potentially collect from the di⁄erent types of taxpayers declaring zero.
So raising the tax rate for a certain income level increases the average ￿ne the authority expects to
collect. Consequently, the tax authority steps up its e⁄ort, which makes evasion less attractive to the
taxpayers with incomes for which the tax rate has not changed.
The observation that a raised individual tax rate increases the auditing e⁄ort of the authority
and the concealment e⁄ort of the taxpayer a⁄ected, suggests that the resources wasted in the contest
increase with the tax rate, too. This is not necessarily true as there is the countervailing e⁄ect of less
evasion from taxpayers with di⁄erent income. Below we plot the results of a typical simulation. We
used the following parameter values: ￿1 = :3; ￿2 = :4; K = :1; and f = 1:25:
Insert ￿gure 5 about here
In ￿gure 5 we plot the equilibrium evasion probabilities depending on tax rates. The left panel
shows the evasion probability for a high-income taxpayer. The evasion probability for a low-income
earner is depicted in the right panel. The analytical results are con￿rmed. The evasion probability
weakly increases with the tax rate for the own income level and weakly deceases with the tax rate for
the other income level.27 More interestingly, ￿gure 6 plots the expected waste depending on the tax
rates.
27Note that the empty area at the lower right of both graphs, relates to tax systems we have excluded (2t2 < t1):
25Insert ￿gure 6 about here
Both panels of ￿gure 6 show the expected waste depending on the tax rates. The right panel gives
a contourplot where lighter shading corresponds to higher waste. We can see that higher tax rates
for low income earners in general weakly increase the expected waste from the contest. Increasing
the high-income tax rate usually also increases the waste. The only occasion where this is not true is
when the high income taxpayer evades with certainty already, while the low-income taxpayer evades
with a probability between 0 and 1. There an increase of t2 reduces the wasted resources as it reduces
the evasion probability of low income earner. Over-all we can see that higher tax rates have the
tendency to increase the waste of resources due to concealment and detection. However, there are
situations where this is not necessarily true. On the other hand, a population of taxpayers, which are
heterogeneous with respect to their moral cost K, makes it very likely that an increased tax rate will
increase aggregate waste. Then the reduced evasion of a few taxpayers in the region where the waste
decreases will be compensated for with all the other taxpayers who are in a region where a higher tax
rate increases the waste. The actual change of waste, although likely to be positive, depends on the
distribution of K in the population.
6 Conclusion
Our main interest in this paper was to examine the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and the resources
spent on concealment and detection activities. Our ￿nding is that higher tax rates lead to more tax
evasion. This rather intuitive result does not lead per se to any policy implications based on welfare
considerations. We do not want to enter the discussion about the relationship between welfare and tax
evasion, since the widely used standard measures for welfare do not appear to be su¢ cient to make a
sensible judgement if we look at tax evasion. The welfare e⁄ect of more or less tax evasion measured by
some form of social welfare criterion is highly sensitive to the criterion used, to assumptions about the
state the economy is in (distortions, public good provision etc.), and to assumptions about individual
preferences.28 Thus it seems to be reasonable to base judgements about the desirability of tax evasion
on broader foundations than traditional welfare economics does. What we can say is that if one
considers tax evasion as undesirable - which we implicitly do - then lower tax rates might be a good
policy measure to reduce it.
More clear-cut are the consequences of our result that higher income tax rates usually imply more
wasteful investment in income concealment and detection. Higher tax rates lead - beside a higher
excess burden - to some extra cost. More scarce resources are unproductively absorbed by the contest
between taxpayer and tax authority.
28A detailed discussion can be found in Cowell (1990), chapter 7.
26Furthermore, our model provides an additional insight into the e⁄ectiveness and desirability of
measures to prevent tax evasion. We saw that an external commitment device, such as law or govern-
mental directives, which forces the tax authority to make sure that no tax evasion takes place, might
not be desirable for income sources which rarely generate income. This is due to the fact that the
detection resources needed to induce truthful revelation then become excessive compared to the small
revenue collected.
Although we have not formally modelled it, it is straightforward that reducing opportunities for
evasion and concealment is a sensible strategy for reducing tax evasion and waste. There are numerous
real world examples of governments trying to reduce these opportunities. Taxation at source reduces
evasion opportunities, while the banks￿duty to report high pay-ins in cash reduces concealment op-
portunities. We see in our model that lower concealment opportunities are more e⁄ective in reducing
the waste, while small evasion opportunities control the extend of evasion more e⁄ectively.
Finally, note that all the in￿ uence factors on tax evasion known from economic psychology (sub-
sumed under attitudes towards tax system, government and authority) play a role in our model. Such
attitudes may be the main in￿ uence on the moral cost of evasion (contained in the ￿xed evasion cost).
Dissatisfaction reduces the scruples (hence the moral cost) of evasion. So, beside the technical means,
a tax system that is conceived as fair, e¢ cient expenditure policy, and a good government performance
may e⁄ectively deter tax evasion, as well as reduced opportunities or low tax rates.
References
Allingham, M. and Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis, Journal of Public
Economics 1: 323￿ 338.
Anderhub, V., Giese, S., Gueth, W., Ho⁄mann, A. and Otto, T. (2001). Tax evsion with earned
income and varying tax rate - an experimental study, mimeo, Huboldt-University Berlin.
Baron, D. and Myerson, R. (1982). Regulating a monopolist with unknown cost, Econometrica 50: 911￿
930.
Bayer, R.-C. (2002). Income tax evasion, opportunities, and evasion costs, forthcomming .
Bayer, R.-C. and Reichl, N. (1997). Ein Verhaltensmodel zur Steuerhinterziehung, Duncker und Hum-
blot, Berlin.
Border, K. and Sobel, J. (1987). Samurai accountant: A theory of auditing and plunder, Review of
Economic Studies 54: 525￿ 540.
Chander, P. and Wilde, L. L. (1998). A general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement,
Review of Economic Studies 65: 165￿ 183.
27Cowell, F. A. (1990). Cheating the Government, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F. (1994). Tax evasion, concealment and the optimal linear income tax, The
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96: 219￿ 239.
Franzoni, L. A. (1999). Tax evasion and tax compliance, in B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds),
Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, pp. 52￿ 94.
Graetz, M. J., Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L. (1986). The tax compliance game: Towards an
interactive theory of law enforcement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2: 1￿ 32.
IRS (1983). Income Tax Compliance Research: Estimates for 1973-1981, Internal Revenue Service,
Washington, DC.
Khalil, F. (1997). Auditing without commitment, RAND Journal of Economics 28(4): 629￿ 640.
Macho-Stadler, I. and Perez-Castrillo, J. D. (1997). Optimal auditing with heterogeneous income
sources, International Economic Review 38(4): 951￿ 968.
Mookherjee, D. and Png, I. P. L. (1989). Optimal auditing, insurance and redistribution, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 104: 399￿ 415.
Mookherjee, D. and Png, I. P. L. (1990). Enforcement costs and the optimal progressivity of income
taxes, Journal of Law, Economics, Organization 6(2): 411￿ 431.
Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L. (1985). Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework,
Journal of Public Economics 26: 1￿ 18.
Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L. (1986). Equilibrium veri￿cation and reporting policies in a model
of tax compliance, International Economic Review 27: 739￿ 760.
Yitzhaki, S. (1974). Income tax evasion: a note, Journal of Public Economics 3: 201￿ 202.
A Proofs of some propositions
This appendix contains proofs for propositions in the main text of the paper.
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. It is su¢ cient to show that the probability of cheating ￿￿ in the hybrid equilibrium increases
with t and that some income sources that previously were reported with positive probability are evaded
with a higher probability as t rises. Note: This also ensures that an income that was previously evaded
28with certainty will be evaded with certainty after the tax rise. Furthermore, an income source that
has been evaded with positive probability will never be declared with certainty, since the condition
for the pure non evasion equilibrium is !(t) ￿ 0 and !(t0) > !(t) for t0 > t.
To show that ￿￿ is rising with t we use equation 22. Since d￿￿=dt = d￿￿=d! ￿ dw=dt and dw=dt =















Since the ￿ne parameter f > 1 and the evasion opportunity ! ￿ 1 the derivative is necessarily real.
Since 0 < ￿ < 1; the derivative is positive.
The condition for a taxpayer just to play a hybrid equilibrium was !(t0) = ￿￿f(2￿+￿)=(￿+￿)2￿".
A change of the tax rate does not e⁄ect the right hand side of this equation. The change on the left
hand side is d!=dt = K=ty2. It follows !(t0) > ￿ ￿ f(1 + 2￿)=(1 + ￿)2 ￿ " if t0 > t0 and K > 0. This
means that for some income sources taxpayers change from the hybrid equilibrium to the pure evasion
equilibrium as the tax rate rises.
A.2 Proposition 2
Proof. The proof consists of three steps: Firstly (a), we show that an increase in the tax rate increases
the waste for parameter con￿gurations that lead to a hybrid equilibrium. Then we do the same for
the pure strategy equilibrium (b). To conclude the proof it will be su¢ cient to show that the waste
function is continuous at the point where the hybrid equilibrium becomes a pure evasion equilibrium
(c). Note: For an income component where before and after the tax rise a pure non-evasion equilibrium
was played (!(t); !(t0) ￿ 0) the waste remains zero.
(a) We can write the expected waste in the hybrid equilibrium as W = a￿(￿￿￿ + 1 ￿ ￿) + (ce￿ +
















If d￿￿=dt; da￿=dt, and de￿=dt are positive then dW=dt is positive, too. In the previous proof we showed
that d￿￿=dt > 0 for K > 0. Taking the detection e⁄ort from equation 23 and di⁄erentiating with
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Since we cannot determine the sign globally, we have to look on the values for t that are relevant for
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￿ are to be understood as the equilibrium e⁄orts in the case that the income is earned and evaded. To
simplify the notation we drop the subscript h.








(f ￿ 1 + K
ty)(K + (f ￿ 1)ty)
> 0 for K > 0;
since f > 1 by construction.
To ￿nish part (a) we just have to make sure that de￿=dt > 0. Here, it is convenient to use equation







4(2 ￿ 2f +
p
f(K + 2(f ￿ 1)ty)
ty
q






















(f ￿ !) > 1 for ! 2 (0;1) the term in brackets, and also
de￿=dt > 0 for the relevant range of the evasion opportunity !.
(b) The expected waste in the pure evasion equilibrium is W = a￿
p+￿e￿
p=￿+￿K = (2tf￿y￿2)=(￿+
￿)2 + ￿K (from equation 15 and 16), which obviously increases with t.









which is the maximum t for that a hybrid evasion equilibrium is obtained. If it does not exist then
the parameters do not allow for a hybrid equilibrium, and we do not have to check for continuity. To
show that the waste function is continuous at ^ t, where the hybrid equilibrium becomes a pure evasion
equilibrium, we have to show that
Wp(^ t) = lim
t￿>^ t+
Wh(t).
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The condition above is obviously ful￿lled if
lim
t￿>^ t+









Using the de￿nition of ￿￿ from equation 22, replacing ! by 1￿K=ty, and taking the right-hand limit




















30Using the de￿nitions of the pure evasion equilibrium e⁄orts from equations 15 and 16, expressing
c as 1=￿, and substituting ^ t gives:
a￿
p(^ t) =
f ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ K
￿2 + 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(f ￿ 1) + ￿2(f ￿ 1)
e￿
p(^ t) =
f ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ K
￿2 + 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(f ￿ 1) + ￿2(f ￿ 1)
.
Taking the limits of a￿
h(t) and e￿
h(t) at ^ t in equations 23 and 24 (knowing that lim
t￿>^ t+
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f ￿ ^ t ￿ y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2
(￿ + ￿)2 = e￿
p(^ t);
if ^ t from equation 17 is plugged in. This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proposition 7
Proof. We have to show that the evasion conditions (C1, C2) for i-income taxpayers relax with
increasing ti and become stricter with increasing tj. The following has to be true:
@
@t2
EU(￿ = 1;d = 0) ￿
@
@t2
EU(￿ = 1;d = 1) ￿ 0 (1:t2)
@
@t1
EU(￿ = 2;d = 0) ￿
@
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EU(￿ = 2;d = 2) ￿ 0 (2:t1)
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EU(￿ = 1;d = 0) ￿
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Note that (1:t1) holds if @￿ ￿1=@t1 > 0; where ￿ ￿1 is the belief which ensures EU(￿ = 1;d = 0) =














































2 ￿ 0, and (f ￿ 1) > 0: Note that ￿0
2 ￿ 0 directly follows from (2:t1) above. The
proof for (2:t2) is analogous.
31Figure 1: Parameter con￿gurations for pure and hybrid evasion equilibria
Figure 2: Evasion probability and waste pecentage for di⁄erent tax rates
Figure 3: Waste percentage for di⁄erent earnings probabilities
32Figure 4: Waste percentages with and without commitment
Figure 5: Equilibrium evasion probabilities for di⁄erent tax systems
Figure 6: Expected equilibrium waste for di⁄erent tax systems
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